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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this action by virtue of the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. S. 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1953 as amended).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court
properly held that Mrs. Atherley had presented no evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find that Albertson's had selected a
method

of

displaying

strawberries

that

created

a

potentially

dangerous condition, that Mrs. Atherley had presented no evidence
from which a jury could reasonably find that it was foreseeable to
Albertson's

that

the

acts

of

third

parties

relating

to

the

strawberry display and marketing method could create a haza1 d, and
that, on the basis of those findings, whether the trial court
properly

granted

Albertson's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

by

dismissing Mrs. Atherley's negligence claim against Albertson's.
On appeal from the granting of summary judgment, the appellate
court will not defer to the trial court's determination of whether
there are material facts in dispute, will view the facts in a light
most favorable to the party against which summary judgment was
entered and review the legal conclusions of the trial court for
correctness, affording it no deference.

Canfield v. Albertsons,

Inc. , (Utah App. 1992), Cert, denied 853 P.2d 897

(Utah 1993).

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment (R at 71 through 90.) and the argument
1

of plaintiff's

counsel

as contained

in the transcript

of

the

hearing on defendant's motion show that this issue was preserved in
the trial court.

(R at 131 through 157.)

DETERMINATIVE

PROVISIONS OF LAW

The only determinative provision of law in this appeal is Rule
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of which is set
forth verbatim in the addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a tort action for negligence arising out of injuries
received by Mrs. Atherley while a customer in one of Albertson's
stores.

In addition to the cause of action for negligence, Mrs.

Atherley's Complaint

stated causes of action for the torts of

conversion, trespass, and breach of privacy.

Mrs. Atherley's

conversion, trespass, and breach of privacy claims were dismissed
pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
B.

Course of Proceedings

Subsequent to plaintiff's Complaint and defendant's Answer
being

filed,

the

parties

undertook

a

period

of

Defendant then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff

in Opposition to

A hearing was held before the trial

court on defendant's motion on April 7, 1995.
C.

discovery.

Disposition in the Trial Court
2

The trial court ruled from the bench granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's negligence claim
only.

The trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's negligence

claim was entered on July 13, 1995.

(R at 115 through 118.)

Plaintiff/appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed on August 9, 1995.
(R at 125 through 126.)
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts

On April 8, 1992, Mrs. Atherley was a customer in Albertson's
Kearns, Utah store.

As she was walking through the store in the

area adjacent to Albertson's produce department, Mrs. Atherley
accidentally stepped on a strawberry that was on the floor causing
her to fall to the floor.

Mrs. Atherley was injured in the fall.

(R at 1 through 9 and 91 through 92.)
Mrs. Atherley provided

evidence

in the form of

affidavit

testimony that strawberry on which she stepped and slipped was
approximately six (6) feet away from the table holding Albertson's
strawberry display.

(R at 92.)

Mrs. Atherley provided

evidence

in the form of

affidavit

testimony that there were no barriers around the strawberry display
table to prevent strawberries from rolling on to the floor, that
there were no floor mats around the strawberry display, and that
the strawberries were displayed in open containers.
through 93.)

(R at 92

The fact that strawberries were displayed in open

containers as a marketing approach is uncontested as is the fact
that

Albertson's

had

available

to

it, and

actually

employed,

alternative methods of displaying strawberries in closed containers
3

greatly reducing the possibility of spillage and the creation of a
hazard to shoppers.
photograph

for

(R at 90.)

illustrative

Mrs. Atherley also produced a
purposes

showing

displays

of

strawberries in open containers and without barriers or floor mats.
(R at 95.)
Albertson's witness, Glenn Wilkes, stated in his affidavit
that "the edge of the dry

tables on which strawberries and similar

produce are displayed have barriers that surround the edges of the
tables

which

are

three

of

(sic)

four

effectively keep the produce on the table."
added)

inches

high

(R at 65.)

and

they

(emphasis

This testimony was disputed by Mrs. Atherley's testimony

and representative photograph and inconsistent with the photograph
provided by Mr. Wilkes and attached to his affidavit.

(R at 68.)

The trial court had evidence before it from which the jury
could conclude that Albertson's could foresee that its method of
displaying strawberries in open containers would commonly result in
strawberries ending up on the floor, thereby creating a hazard to
Albertson's customers.
"it

is not uncommon

In his affidavit, Mr. Wilkes testified that
to see a piece of produce

strawberry, lettuce leaf, etc.) on the floor...."

(i.e., grape,
(R at 66.)

The

trial court also had evidence that Albertson's had knowledge of a
pattern of customer behavior relating to openly-displayed produce
that often created the kind of hazard that caused Mrs. Atherley's
injuries.

(R at 66.)

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Utah

law recognizes

two

separate

and distinct

legal

theories under which a store owner may be liable for a patron's
slip and fall.

The trial court failed to view the two theories of

liability separately.

Instead, the trial court merged the two

theories, effectively depriving Mrs. Atherley of her opportunity to
present her case against Albertson's under the second theory of
liability.

By

requiring

Mrs.

Atherley

to

meet

the

notice

requirement of the first theory, the trial court improperly found
cause to dismiss Mrs. Atherley's negligence

claim pursuant

to

Albertson's motion for summary judgment.
II.

In challenging Albertson's motion for summary judgment,

Mrs. Atherley presented the trial court with evidence supporting
her negligence claim under the second theory of liability.

She

established that Albertson's chose a method of operation whereby
strawberries were openly displayed

in uncovered

cartons.

She

presented evidence that Albertson's could foresee that the acts of
third

party

customers

in

relation

to

the

openly-displayed

strawberries could result in strawberries falling or being dropped
to the floor.

Finally, she presented evidence to indicate that

Albertson's did not act reasonably to protect its customers from
the

dangerous

strawberries

condition

because

it

created
failed

by
to

its
put

method
barriers

of

selling

around

the

strawberry display to stop strawberries from rolling to the floor
and failed to place non-skid floor mats around the
display.

strawberry

Despite having these facts and the issues raised by them
5

at hand, the trial court, contrary to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and the long history of case precedent relating to
summary judgment, granted Albertson's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed Mrs. Atherley's negligence claim.
III. The trial court improperly ruled as a matter of law that
Albertson's method of display was not dangerous.

In making its

ruling, the trial court improperly took over the role of factfinder
from the jury.

The trial court erred in making this determination

as a matter of law.

The question of whether Albertson's chosen

method of displaying strawberries was dangerous is fact sensitive
and may not be decided as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH LAW CONCERNING STORE
OWNER LIABILITY TO PATRONS AND IMPROPERLY DISMISSED
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

The Trial Court Failed To Properly Apply the Tests Defined

By the Utah Court of Appeals In Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc.
Much of the argument contained in this brief was made to the
trial

court

opposition

in Mrs. Atherley's

behalf

in the

context

to Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment.

of

her

These

arguments failed below because the trial court failed to correctly
interpret

the

law

as

it

has

developed

relating

to

premises

liability. Utah law recognizes two separate and distinct theories,
either of which may be applied to determine if a store owner is
liable for its patrons' slip and fall injuries. The two applicable

6

theories are defined in Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 841 P. 2d
1224 (Utah App. 1992), Cert, denied 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
In general, there are two legal theories under which a
store owner may be found negligent and held liable for a
patron's injuries in a "slip and fall" case in Utah. The
first theory involves situations where there is a
temporary or transient hazard within the store that was
not created by the store owner, its agents, or employees.
Under this theory, in order to find a store owner
negligent, it must be shown that the store owner "knew or
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of
any hazardous condition and had reasonable opportunity to
remedy the same." [Citations omitted.\
The second theory, which governs the case before us,
involves situations where the store owner, its agents, or
employees create or are responsible for the dangerous
condition. Under this theory, a plaintiff does not need
to establish notice since a store owner is deemed to have
notice of the dangerous condition it creates.
Canfield, page 1226.
It

should

not

the

trial

persuade

have

been

court

necessary

that

for Mrs. Atherley

Albertson's

had

actual

to
or

constructive knowledge that the particular strawberry on which she
fell had fallen or been dropped to the floor.
insisted,

however,

interpreted

that

Canfield

to

Mrs.

Atherley

require

the

meet

The trial court
this

showing

of

burden
actual

and
or

constructive notice as part of the requirement of satisfying the
second theory of liability.

The trial court commented from the

bench that it
[had a hard time seeing why it should hold Albertson's]
liable or at least allow it to go to the jury when there
is nothing
to give me reason to believe
that
[Albertson's] had notice of [the strawberry] and that
[Albertson's] had notice that [the strawberry] was in a
dangerous condition and that it was foreseeable that this
person would fall on that strawberry or any person would
fall on that strawberry.
(R at 146 through 147.) (emphasis added).
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Albertson's

placed

substantial

emphasis

on the

fact

that

neither it nor Mrs. Atherley knew precisely how the strawberry had
found its way to the floor.
point

significant.

The trial court apparently found this

Mrs. Atherley

could

not,

at

the

summary

judgment phase of her case, and cannot now show that Albertson's
had

actual

or constructive

knowledge

of

strawberry on the floor where she fell.
Canfield

the presence

of

that

The law as defined in

relieves Mrs. Atherley of that harsh and

inequitable

burden of proof.
In this case, Ms. Canfield alleges that she slipped on a
lettuce leaf on the floor near a display of farmer's pack
lettuce. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to Ms. Canfield, Albertson's chose a method of displaying
and offering lettuce for sale where it was expected that
third parties would remove and discard the outer leaves
from heads of lettuce they intended to purchase. It was
reasonably foreseeable that under this method of
operation some leaves would fall or be dropped on the
floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous
condition.
Because Albertson's chose this method of
operation, the question of whether Albertson's had
notice, either actual or constructive, is not relevant.
The relevant question is whether Albertson's took
reasonable precautions to protect customers against the
dangerous condition it created.
Canfield, page 1227.

(Emphasis added.)

The facts in Canfield are strikingly similar to those in Mrs.
Atherley's case.

In Canfield, Albertson's displayed lettuce in

what is commonly called a "farmer's pack" at the end of one of the
produce display tables.

The individual heads of lettuce were not

wrapped and were placed in boxes allowing customers to sort through
the heads of lettuce in making their selection.

These factors

differentiated the "farmer's pack" from lettuce sold individually
wrapped in cellophane.

Customer's regularly discarded the outer
8

leaves of the "farmer's pack" lettuce.

Albertson's had placed

empty boxes around the lettuce display to provide a place where
customers could throw the discarded leaves.

At least one of the

discarded leaves apparently missed the empty box and ended up on
the floor where Ms. Canfield stepped on it, slipped, and fell.
In Mrs. Atherley's case, Albertson's displayed strawberries in
uncovered boxes and containers which customers could sort through
and

"pick

as

many

strawberries

as

they

want."

(R at

90.)

Albertson's, at the same time, also displayed strawberries for sale
"in quart containers (i.e., closed plastic containers); and ... in
three packs

(i.e., a closed container that holds three pints of

strawberries) ; . . . "

(R

at

90. )

It

can

be

said

that

the

strawberries sold in uncovered boxes were marketed in a "farmer's
pack."
Allowing

customers

to

strawberries and lettuce may

sort

through

"farmer's

pack"

be good marketing and may allow

Albertson's to achieve maximum sales by presenting an attractive
display to customers but, by allowing customers to pick through the
strawberries and package the strawberries themselves, Albertson's
created a risk that strawberries would either fall to the floor or
be dropped

there by customers.

It was undisputed below that

Albertson's chose this method of marketing strawberries.
and 66.)

(R at 90

Albertson's argued, however, that because Mrs. Atherley

could not show how that strawberry got to the floor she was not
entitled to her day in court.

Under Canfield, Mrs. Atherley does

9

not have to show how the strawberry reached the floor in order to
prevail in her negligence claim against Albertson's.
The method

of operation,

displaying

containers, was chosen by Albertson's.

strawberries

(R at 90.)

in open

Evidence was

before the trial court establishing that Albertson's knew that
customers would sort through, bump, or knock strawberries out of
the display and even drop them from uncovered containers off of a
display that did not have a barrier to prevent them from falling to
the floor.

(R at 66 and 90.)

Canfield established that:

[W]here the store owner chooses a method of operation
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable
acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition,
an injured party need not prove either actual or
constructive knowledge of the specific condition.
[Citation omitted.]
In this type of case, notice is
satisfied as a matter of law because the store owner is
deemed to be informed of the dangerous condition since it
adopted the method of operation.
Canfield, page 1226.

The Court went on to state that:

To relieve the plaintiff of the requirement of proving
actual or constructive notice in such instances is to
effect a more equitable balance in regards to the burdens
of proof.
[Citation omitted].
Canfield, page 1227.
The evidence presented to the trial court by Mrs. Atherley
raised sufficient issues of fact to satisfy the second theory of
liability

set

Albertson's

forth

chose

in
the

Canfield.
method

strawberries in open containers.

of

Mrs. Atherley
operation,

showed

i.e.,

that

selling

She presented contested evidence

that the tables on which the strawberries were openly displayed had
no barriers to prevent strawberries from rolling to the floor and
that there were not mats around the table to reduce the risk from
10

strawberries that had fallen.

(R at 92 through 93.)

She also

established that Albertson's knew that customer actions commonly
resulted in strawberries, grapes, and peanuts falling to the floor,
thereby satisfying the foreseeability requirement.

(R at 66.)

The trial court refused to recognize the separate and distinct
nature of the second theory of liability defined in Canfield or to
relieve

Mrs. Atherley

of

the harsh burden

effectively eliminated by the second theory.

of proof

which

is

Instead, the trial

court merged the two theories and, because Mrs. Atherley could not
show actual or constructive notice as required in the first theory
of liability, dismissed her negligence claim against Albertson's.
The trial court's inability to separate the two theories is clear
in its pronouncement from the bench:
The Court also finds that there is no evidence that the
store had any opportunity to remedy the single strawberry
that was on the floor had they had -- nor that they had
any notice that it was there until the accident occurred.
Thus there is no potential for the Court to find that
there was adequate foreseeability of the store to be held
liable, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment
is granted.
(R at 156.)
The foreseeability required by the second theory of liability is
not the same as the notice requirement of the first theory.

The

clear and obvious purpose of the second theory of liability defined
in Canfield is to relieve plaintiffs of the notice requirements of
the first theory,

yet the trial court required Mrs. Atherley to

prove notice in order to satisfy the foreseeability requirement.
This Court could not have made the distinction any clearer than it
did:

11

In this type of case, notice is satisfied as a matter of
law because the storeowner is deemed to be informed of
the dangerous condition since it adopted the method of
operation.
Canfield, page 1226. The trial court's improper merging of the two
theories of liability renders the entire purpose of this Court's
holding in Canfield meaningless.
II.

Mrs. Atherley Presented Sufficient Evidence To Overcome

Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment
Because Mrs. Atherley raised issues of fact sufficient to
state a cause of action under the second theory of liability set
forth in Canfield, it was improper for the trial court to dismiss
her negligence claim pursuant to Albertson's motion.

The trial

court was determined, however, not to let Mrs. Atherley's claim go
to a jury.

In Canfield, this Court held that:

In deciding whether the trial court correctly determined
that there were no genuine issues of material fact, we do
not defer to the trial court's determination of whether
there are material facts in dispute, but review the facts
and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the losing party. [Citation omitted.] Any
doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are
resolved in favor of the losing party.
[Citation
omitted]. Ms. Canfield also challenges the trial court's
legal conclusions which we review for correctness, giving
no deference to the trial court. [Citation omitted].
Canfield, page 1226.

The standard of review expressed by this

Court in Canf ield has been established through a long line of cases
in the Utah appellate courts.

It recognizes the harsh nature of

summary

the

judgment

rulings

and

fact

that

summary

judgments

deprive the losing party of the opportunity to present her claim to
the

factfinder.

In Mrs. Atherley's

Albertson's choice, is a jury.
12

case, the

factfinder,

by

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the moving party
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."

(Addendum, page 1. )

Albertson's did not meet that burden

in relation to Mrs. Atherley7s claim and summary judgment was
improper.
The critical material facts have been set forth and addressed
in the Statement of Facts and section "I" of the argument, above.
Mrs. Atherley presented ample evidence from which a jury could find
that Albertson's chose a method of operation that resulted in the
creation of a hazard, that it was foreseeable to Albertson's that
the acts of customers in conjunction with its method of operation
could result in the creation of a hazard, and that Albertson's
failed to take adequate precautions (no barriers or floor mats) to
protect its customers from the risk of injury.

Again, turning to

Canfield for guidance:
Given Albertson's decision to use farmer's pack displays,
the inquiry therefore becomes whether Albertson's did
what was "reasonably necessary to protect the customer
from the risk of injury that mode of operation is likely
to generate."
[Citations omitted.]
This inquiry
necessarily focuses on the store owner's actions prior
to, or contemporary with, the creation of the dangerous
condition. Each determination of whether the protective
measures taken were reasonable is fact sensitive.... In
any event the fact finder must determine whether the
store owner's vigilance in protecting against a condition
or hazard was commensurate with the risk created by the
method of operation [Citation omitted.]
Canfield, page 1227.
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Instead

of

recognizing

that

Mrs. Atherley

had

presented

material issues of fact sufficient to defeat Albertson's motion,
the trial court put itself in the role of the jury and weighed the
facts in reaching its decision.
I have seen the farmer cases. I just saw it recently in
-- on the 17th of March when they had Saint Patrick's Day
and they had cases of cabbage right next to the corn
(sic) beef, and the cabbage was in farmer-packed cases,
and people were picking off leaves and things like that,
and there was some risk associated with that, and the
cases were out in front of the meat counter. So I can
see that....But I have a harder time seeing why, when
they have a normal stand of distribution and one
strawberry falls, that I should hold them liable or at
least allow it to go to the jury when there is nothing to
give me reason to believe that they had notice of
it....(R at 146.)
The

trial

court

actually

argued

considered and assessed by a jury.

facts

that

should

have

been

The mere fact that the trial

court entered into an analysis comparing cabbage to strawberries
establishes that there was a sufficient issue of material fact that
deserved to be heard by a jury.
It is for a jury to decide if the facts presented by Mrs.
Atherley are sufficient to meet the requirements of the second
theory of liability and allow Mrs. Atherley's recovery against
Albertson's.

The trial court refused to allow the evidence to be

examined by the jury and, in so doing, deprived Mrs. Atherley of
her day in court.

The trial court held Mrs. Atherley to a standard

higher than the law allows by requiring her, in effect, to prove
that her evidence was sufficient for her to win the case.

Rule 56

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and all of the case law
interpreting the rule require only that the party present issues of
14

material

fact.

Mrs. Atherley

met

that

requirement

and

the

dismissal of her negligence claim was improper.
Ill.

The Trial Court Improperly Ruled As A Matter Of Law That

Albertson's Method Of Display Was Not Hazardous Or Risky
The trial court's ruling dismissing Mrs. Atherley's negligence
claim as a matter of law was contrary to generations of legal
precedent cautioning against summary judgment in cases where facts
are in dispute and subject to more than one interpretation.

In

particular, in relation to negligence claims, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that:
As
a
general
proposition,
summary
judgment
is
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its
merits, and should be employed "only in the most clearcut case." (Citations omitted.)
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App.
1989), Cert, denied 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990).
In some ways,

it appears

that

the

trial

court

was

more

concerned with making tort law than applying the law as it has
developed and is so clearly defined in Canfield.

This is evident

from the following statement made by the trial court:
If I follow your argument, I must come to the conclusion
that they must take any of these items that are subject
to sorting and prepackage them in a closed container, and
I don't think that that should be the objective of the
Court.
They ought to be entitled to package as they
wish. Someone purchasing may wish to purchase less than
the packaged amount of any kind of prepackaged items. (R
at 145.)
It is up to the factfinder to determine if Albertson's should be
able to "package as they wish" without incurring any liability for
its chosen method of operation.
15

It was improper for the trial

court to make that determination as a matter of law in a summary
j udgment proceeding.
Finally, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that:
The method of the display has not been shown to the
Court's satisfaction to be in any way inappropriate or
hazardous or risky. (R at 156.)
It was improper for the trial court to rule on the appropriateness
of Albertson's method of display as a matter of law.

This Court

held in Canfield that:
[T]he trial court erred in determining, as a matter of
law, that Albertsons acted reasonably in its attempts to
protect its customers from the dangerous condition. This
determination is fact sensitive and may not be decided as
a matter of law.
Canfield, page 1228.

(Emphasis added.)

The determination of

whether a method of operation creates a dangerous condition is
equally fact sensitive and not a matter for summary judgment. Mrs.
Atherley is entitled to present her case to a jury.

CONCLUSION
The

trial

court

improperly

dismissed

Mrs.

Atherley's

negligence claim on Albertson's motion for summary judgment. Mrs.
Atherley presented facts to the trial court which were sufficient
under the second theory of liability defined in Canfield to avoid
summary judgment and to go to a jury.

The trial court erred in its

interpretation of the holding in Canfield and, as a result, held
Mrs. Atherley to a higher standard, based on the merging of the two
theories of liability, than she should have been required to meet.
The trial court improperly took over the role of factfinder in
16

analyzing and weighing Mrs. Atherley's evidence and in dismissing
her claim on its merits.

The trial court's analysis intruded into

the role of the factfinder.

Albertson's obtained summary judgment

too easily in this case because the trial court failed to apply the
proper standard in determining the appropriateness of that harsh
remedy.
Summary judgment. . .should be granted with extreme caution
where the negligence of the property owner is alleged.
(Citation omitted.)
Issues involved in negligence
"become questions of law only when the facts are
undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from
them."
(Citation omitted.)
Canfield at 1226.
Justice demands that the trial court's summary judgment order
be reversed and that this matter be remanded so that Mrs. Atherley
can present her case to the jury, the only proper factfinder in
this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this g / 3 i ^ a y of February, 1996.

Don R. Schow
Mark R. McDougal & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Lynn F. Atherley
4360 South Redwood Rd., Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
(801) 969-2424
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following:
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

fcult judgment where notice is required only
jjy custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383
failure of party or his attorney to appear at
Atrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303

Rule 56

Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134

gjile 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
..expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
amotion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
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Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

154

forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
—Mortgage note.
—Negligence.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
—Note.
—Recovery for goods and services.
—Stock ownership.
—Wrongful possession.
Summary judgment proper.
—Contract action.
—Contract terms.
—Deceit.
—Jurisdiction.
—Negligence.
—Res ipsa loquitur.
Time for motion.
Written statement of grounds.
Cited.
Affidavit
—Contents.
Specific facts are required to show whether
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776
(Utah 1984).
When a motion for summary judgment is
made under this rule, the affidavit of an adverse party must contain specific evidentiary
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747
(Utah 1985).
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff that contained opinion, legal conclusions, and facts not
supported by adequate foundation but portions
of which complied with Subdivision (e), because the objectionable statements did nothing
more than supplement the arguments made in
plaintiff's memorandum, did not prejudice defendants. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993).
—Corporation.
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a
corporation, it is generally considered to be the
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the
personal knowledge of an agent of the corporation who is not a corporate officer regarding
the facts to which he has sworn will generally
not be presumed, and therefore, the specific
"means and sources" of his information should
be shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987).
—Experts.
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows the expert
to state his opinion concerning the ultimate
issue in the case, and an expert affidavit must
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the
opinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit is sufficient if it articulates the facts upon which the
opinion was based and if the facts were of the
"type usually relied upon by experts in the
field." Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.
—Guardianship.
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RLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
RANDALL D . LUND ( A 5 6 1 7 )
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^
^ * ™"
SALi LMKC COUNTY

10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 9y
Post Office Box 45000
'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Do»l»¥ C ! P *

Attorneys for Defendant Albertson's Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LYNN F. ATHERLEY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 940904525FI

vs.

Judoe David S. Youna

ALBERTSON'S, INC.
Defendant.

Defendant Albertson's ("Albertson's") Motion for Summary
Judgment came on for hearing on the 7th day of April, 1995,
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Davis S. Young
presiding.

Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Don R.

Schow, and Albertson's was represented by its attorney, Randall
D. Lund.

The Court having heard oral argument by counsel for

both parties and having previously reviewed the memoranda,
affidavits and other documents submitted by counsel for the
parties in connection with Albertson's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and otherwise being fully advised in the circumstances,
finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
Albertson's is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I
22

of Plaintiff's Complaint for Negligence because despite the
express requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
1.

Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence

indicating that Albertson's employees created a condition or
defect which proximately caused, created or otherwise contributed
to the creation of the alleged temporary hazard;
2.

Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence

indicating that Albertson's method of operation made it
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties
would result in the creation of the alleged temporary hazard;
3.

Plaintiff has failed to introduce any evidence that

Alfe^rtson's had notice of the temporary hazard cr that, through
the exercise of reasonable care, Albertson's should have known of
the temporary hazard before the alleged accident occurred; and
4.

Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that Albertson's had

notice of the hazard, Plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence
that Albertson's had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the
temporary hazard.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby
granted and summary 3udgment is hereby entered m
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favor of

Defendant Albertson's, Inc., on Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint
for Negligence, with both parties to bear their own costs.
DATED this / 3 " ^ d a y of

CVci^f

, 1995.

Davip SJ. i Young

Districts Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
MARK R. MCDOUGAL & ASSOC,

By

JAr^
Don R. Scfiow
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SH\RDL\15-631.032\ATw£RLEY.0R:)
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss .
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Suzanne H. Hurst, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for Defendant Albertsons, Inc. herein; that she served
the attached ORDER (Case Number 940904525PI, Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County) upon the parties listed below
by placing a true and correct copy theyreof in an envelope
addressed to:
Don R. Schow
MARK R. MCDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4360 South Redwood Road, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the (f

day of July, 1995.

t jpt^^^x'^
Suzanne\ H. Hurst
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before Stile this // ^

day of July,

1995
N0TAR# PUBLIC
~T
esiding in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:

w

y

sr-L
Jfc. - - ,

•:.-•
fc.
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STATU OF UTAH
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNN F. ATHERLEY
Plaintiff
N o . 940904525 PI

vs .
ALBERTSON'S.

INC

Defendant

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
Aoril 7, 1995
Defendant's Motion for Summarv

Reported by
Lori L a w r e n c e , CSR. RPR, CP
File N o .
0 40795LL
26

Judament

ALPHA
Court Reporting Service
P.O. Box 510047
SLC, Utah 84151-0047
(801) 532-5645

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
For the Plaintiff

Mr. Don R. Schow
MARK R. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES
4360 South Redwood Road
Suite 1
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84123

For the Defendant:

Mr. Randall D. Lund
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAl"
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84111
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1

I

Salt Lake Citv, Utah: April 7, 1995: 10:10 a.m

2
3

I

THE COURT:

All right.

The next matter to be

4

considered is the matter of Lynn Atherley versus

5

Albertson's, Inc., Case No. 940902 -- or 4525.

6

state your appearances, please.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13

MR. SCHOW:

Counsel,

Don R. Schow for the plaintiff, Lynn

Atherley.
MR. LUND:

Randall D. Lund for Albertson's,

Incorporated, defendant.
THE COURT;

All right.

Mr. Lund, it's your

motion for summary judgment.
MR. LUND:

Thank youf your Honor.

If it please

14

the Court and counsel:

lb

to work one day and receive a case that will in some way

16

change your life or stay with you for a long time, and that

17

happened to me several years ago when I came to work.

18

was my first Albertson's case.

19

claim by one Mary Canfield, and since that time. I don't

20

think I've ever had a professional day that's gone by that

21

I haven't heard something about the case of Canfield versus

22

Albertson's.

23

It's interesting how you can come

It

Received information on a

And in approaching the Court todayf I feel that

24

it's my responsibility really to distinguish between the

25

case of Canfield versus Albertson's and this case and in
28

that resoect show whv summarv iudament is merited in this
case
Now, the facts of this case are very
We have a plaintiff who was walking in an

straightforward.

Albertson's store.

She slipped and fell on a strawberry.

It's a given fact that she did not see the strawberry
before she stepped on it.
Now, this photograph is the best that we have,
and we apologize for the qualitv of it, but this is a
photograph of the produce area.

At this end, we have where

the strawberries were displayed, and in this area right
here is where the slip and fall occurred.

The purpose of

this line, of course, is a measurement from the end of this
display table to the corner, which we submit is about
twenty-five feet.

Now, that is a disputed fact by the

plaintiff, but we submit that it's really not relevant in
light of the law that we're going to discuss today.
Your Honor, there are some similarities between
the case of Canfield versus Albertson's and Lynn Atherlev
v. Albertson's.
defendant.

We have a slip and fall.

We have the same

We have the same defense attorney.

opportunity for notice.

We have no

There's not much dispute about

notice, but there are significant distinctions, and that's
what I'd really like to talk about for a moment.
The first distinction that I think is important:
29

In the case of Canfield versus Albertson's, the accident in
question took place right in front of the farmers' pack
3
4
5

I lettuce display.

Now, little is talked about in the

opinion of Canfield versus Albertson's about what a
J farmers' oack lettuce disolav is, but in realitv it is a

6

box of lettuce heads that have been shipped straight to the

7

store by the farmer.

8

box, they stick it out there, and people are allowed to

9

come in.

10

Albertson's rips open the top of the

It's a very efficient way to sell lettuce.
Now, the problem with that is you need to remove

11

the outer leaves.

12

want them.

13

try to protect ourselves by putting garbage cans on the

14

floor because we know those customers are going to walk in

15
16
17

They're not desirable.

People don't

We know it, and the customer knows it, and we

I and take those lettuce leaves off, and they're going to
discard them, and they're on the floor.
And in the case of Canfield versus Albertson's,

18

there was testimony by a number of Albertson's employees

19

who testified that this was a known problem, that those

20

lettuce leaves were there, they were discarded, and despite

21

the boxes, they ended up on the floor.

22

factor in this case.

23

There is no similar

The slip-and-fall incident, well, in our -- to

24

our respect, we submit occurred twenty-five to thirty feet

25

awav from the strawberrv displav.
30

Plaintiff admits,

nevertheless, that it was six to ten feet away, so the
proximity is different.
The knowledge of the store is different.

We

knew, with respect to the lettuce heads, that lettuce was
5 | being discarded on the floor.
6

There is no evidence in this

| case of any similar problem with respect to strawberries.
I think, your Honor, that it's important to

8

| distinguish between a case like Canfield, where you have a

9

| constant, recognizable problem, and the general

10 | consequences of running a store.

We put things on shelves.

11

I People come into stores.

12

They bring their kids.

13

policy of the court has never been to force these

14

supermarkets to become insurers.

15

them to apply reasonable standards.

16

They buy things off shelves.

They bring their families, and the

It's always been to ask

Now, because these things are in the produce area

17

because they're displayed for sale, people can look at

18

them.

19

number of reasons, they can end up in any number of places

20

in many different areas in the store.

21

They can put them in their grocery cart, and for any

And so you have to distinguish between the

22

situation where the store does something in Canfield that

23

it knows causes a problem and the facts of this case where

24

we have a strawberry.

25

have no idea where it came from, and the plaintiff herself
31

We have no idea how it got there, we

admitted that she doesn't know how long it had been there.
So for those reasons, we submit that the notice law applies
in this case.
Now, we submit that plaintiff has raised the
issue of Canfield for this reason.
the notice argument.

They want to circumvent

In Canfield, the Court held if, in

fact, you can show that the store has done something to
create the hazard, we are going to waive the notice
provision of the law*
Now, as the Court knows, it's usually a
two-point -- or a two-prong test.
notice of the hazard?

Did the store have

And, No. 2, did the store have an

opportunity to remedy the hazard?

If the plaintiff can

respond to both of those positively, they can go to trial.
If they don't have evidence on those two points, they
can't, and in this case, there is no evidence on either
point.
Another distinguishing factor, your Honor, is
just the absence of evidence in this case.

One of the

troubling aspects of Canfield is that, yes, there is.
language in the case that talks about what happens when the
store adopts a method of display that may create or
contribute to the hazard, but in Canfield, we are inundated
with the expert affidavits of the plaintiff talking about
what were recognized standards for grocerv stores, what
32

stores were doina to orevent slio-and-fall accidents, what
they could do, what they should do, what stores throughout
the country were doing.
There is no similar evidence in this case.
5

plaintiff has pointed to Canfield.

6

made this allegation.

7

were negligently displayed."

8
9

The

They have said, "We've

We've said that the strawberries

Well, that argument fails, we submit, for two
reasons.

No. 1, there is no testimony from a person

10

qualified to give an opinion as to what a reasonable method

11

of display is with respect to strawberries.

12

there.

13

enough.

14

something wrong with the display, we've got the distance,

15

at least six to ten feet, and Mrs. Atherley admits she

16

doesn't know how it got there.

17

It's just not

We have an allegation under Rule 56(e).

It's not

No. 2. even if we were to assume that there is

So, your Honor, Albertson's argument, very

18

briefly, is this.

No. 1, we're entitled to summary

19

judgment because we had no notice of the hazard.

20

no evidence that anybody knew about this strawberry until

21

after the accident.

22

remedy the hazard until after the accident.

There is

Certainly we had no opportunity to

23

And finally, even if we do apply Canfield, even

24

if we assume that for some reason Albertson's should have

25

known, that we're going to waive the notice requirement,
33

1

there's no evidence with respect to her negligence

2

allegations.

3

has any questions --

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LUND:

6

THE COURT:

Mr. Schow?

7

MR. SCHOW:

Thank you, your Honor.

Be just her allegations.

Unless the Court

Thank you, Mr. Lund.
Thank you.

Defendant

8

depends to a large extent in its motion on alleging that

9

the plaintiff is relying on mere allegations of her

10

complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment in that

11

she's presented no fact presenting a genuine issue of --

12

genuine issue for trial, and that's simply inaccurate.
If her affidavit merely stated Albertson's was

13
14

negligent, then certainly that's a conclusorv statement and

15

not sufficient to defeat summary judgments but the mere

16

fact that the statements made in plaintiff's affidavit

17

support the factual allegations of her complaint doesn't

18

render those statements inappropriate, and it doesn't

19

render them unable to -- to present facts to defeat summary

20

judgment.

21

There are soecific factual allegations made in

22

the complaint.

23

affidavit.

24

doesn't render them inappropriate in her affidavit.

25

Those are supported by statements in her

The simple fact that they're in both places

THE COURT:

You concur that the law is that
34

1

Albertson's must have notice of the problem and, in

2

addition, an opportunity to remedy that problem?

3

MR. SCHOW:

No, your Honor, not under Canfield.

4

THE COURT:

What do you think the Canfield law

5

requires of Albertson's?
MR. SCHOW:

6

Your Honor, Canfield requires

7

primarily that plaintiff be able to present facts from

8

which the trier of fact can infer or believe that

9

Albertson's first engaged or set up a dangerous method of

10

operation.

What that does is it establishes Albertson's

11

not necessarily liability at that point, but it establishes

12

Albertson's involvement in establishing that dangerous

13

condition.

14

Then the Canfield court does speak somewhat of

15

foreseeability, but that's not the same thing as notice,

16

your Honor.

17

again and again in his memoranda and before the Court this

18

morning is notice under the other standard where plaintiff

19

would have to show that Albertson's actually knew that

20

strawberry was on the floor and failed to do something

21

about it.

22

The notice that defense counsel has gone over

Canfield doesn't require that.

In fact, Canfield

23

states that that is an unreasonable burden of proof to put

24

on a plaintiff because a plaintiff isn't privy to the same

25

information as the defendant is in these cases.
35

11
1

THE COURT:

I don't have any problem with that

2

phiJosophy myself, that the plaintiff shouldn't have to

3

show sort of the old one-bite rule that somebody has

4

done -- notice that they have an animal of a mean and

5

mischievous disposition before they can get recovery.

6

problem that I have with this case is that whatever the

7

distance, six to twenty-five feet, you have a single

8

strawberry on the floor.

9

I've heard.

10
11

MR. SCHOW:

The

At least that's the best evidence

And that's the best evidence we have

to date on that particular strawberry.

12

THE COURT:

Okay, and that strawberry could get

13

there multiple ways.

14

negligence of an employee, and that would have greater

15

liability for Albertson's.

16

putting strawberries in their basket and driving beyond the

17

strawberries between six and twenty feet and having one

18

spill out that they don't observe and it's simply on the

19

floor, and I can see that Albertson's might be charged with

20

a duty to know that people can spill goods as they travel

21

around the store and that they should pick those up

22

immediately, and there's no reason to believe that they

23

would not had they had the opportunity to see this

24

strawberry, and there's no reason to believe that they saw

25

it and didn't pick it up.

It could get there, one, by

36

It could get there by somebody

We don't have any evidence such

12
as that.
2

But if the trier of fact has to have facts given

3

to it that would cause one to conclude that there was some

4

dangerous method of operation, what facts would you propose

5

to establish that?
MR. SCHOW:

6

Those facts would be this, your

7

Honor, and I don't think they're facts that we need to

8

bring an expert in to determine.

9

possibly Forrest Gump would be the best one to determine by

10

lookina at the wav strawberries are displaved. that thev're

11

open

12

I think in this case,

There are alternative methods, closed containers

13

Albertson's markets them both ways, either in closed

14

containers or openly.

15

say, create a bigger hazard because customers are, in

16

effect, invited to handle individual strawberries, to pack

17

them and overpack them and to abuse the system basically.

18

The open containers, a juror could

But Canfield addresses that, your Honor.

The

19

Court in Canfield states, "There is no logical distinction

20

between a situation in which the store owner directly

21

creates the condition or defect and where the store owner's

22

method of operation creates a situation where it is

23

reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third

24

parties will create a dangerous condition or defect."

25

Now, we have evidence of that foreseeabilitv,
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1

| your Honor, not presented by plaintiff but presented by

2

I defendant.

3

| states, "On occasion, as customers taste the produce or

4

I give samples to their kids, they will drop the occasional

5

grape, strawberry, or peanut on the floor wherever they

6

happen to be in the store.

7

drop produce from their carts as they shop, it is not

8

uncommon to see a piece of produce -- example, grape.

9

strawberry, lettuce leaf, et cetera —

10
11

In Paragraph 16 of his affidavit, Mr. Wilkes

Because customers occasionally

on the floor on the

other side of the store."
It is not uncommon to see this.

This man with

12

all of these years of experience is testifying to that

13

fact, and that's why whether plaintiff can prevail or not

14

on how far the strawberry was from the display is really

15

not relevant because we have Albertson's own expert stating

16

that is not uncommon to see these strawberries on the other

17

side of the store.

18

Now, here's what the -- the jury can infer from

19

the facts that are already presented.

20

Mr. Wilkes' statement, look at the types of things he said

21

it's not unusual to see.

22

and lettuce leaves.

23

by choice, displays openly and without protection.

24
25

First of all, from

Strawberries, grapes, peanuts,

These are all things that Albertson's,

Now, it's a disputed fact whether there are
barriers or mats around.

These are things that could maybe
38

mitigate against Albertson's negligence, but those are
2 I disputed facts.
3 I
4

But these are all items that have alternate
methods of display.

Grapes can be put in bags and sold.

5 J Strawberries are put in plastic cartons that are closed
6

that customers merely pick up and put in the cart,

7

virtual]y eliminating any chance of spillage.

8

marketed in an open display or also in bags, as are -- as

9

is lettuce.

Peanuts are

The farmer pack display is very different from

10

the standard display where each head of lettuce is wrapped

11

in cellophane.

12

These are facts that are now available for the

13

jury, and the jury can look at that, combined with

14

Albertson's own statement that this is a foreseeable

J
15

problem, and it's foreseeable, because of the way they

16

choose to operate in the display and marketing of

17

strawberries and other loose produce, that the jury could

18

infer negligence on the part of Albertson's under the

19
20

J Canfield analysis.
Under Canfield, plaintiff doesn't have to show

21

that Albertson's failed to adequately monitor either.

She

22

simply has to show facts from which the jury could infer

23

that a method of operation —

24

displaying strawberries open and loose for customers to go

25

through -- is a dangerous method and some degree of
39

in this case, the method of

15
1

I foreseeability at least, which Albertson's has established,

2

I as I said
And there's really -- there's really not much
difference between strawberries and lettuce, your Honor,

5

I unless we're talking about what you're going to put on your

6

I breakfast cereal.

The same situation arises.

Customers

are free -- in fact, they're invited to do their own
8

selecting, to do their own culling where strawberries are

9

concerned.

In other words, they see one that doesn't look

10

very appealing.

11

knows what with it.

12

They're going to set that aside or do who

But Albertson's has established it knows what the

13

third-party customers are doing, and that's specifically

14

what Canfield addresses.

15

THE COURT:

If I follow your argument, I must

16

come to the conclusion that they must take any of these

17

items that are subject to sorting and prepackage them in a

18

closed container, and I don't think that that should be the

19

objective of the Court.

20

package as they wish.

21

purchase less than the packaged amount of any kind of

22

prepackaged items.

23

They ought to be entitled to

Someone purchasing may wish to

For instance, mushrooms, they prepackage those,

24

and we've all seen them with the cellophane over them.

25

They also have a case of them that you can pick.
40

If you

16
want ten mushrooms or one mushroom or whatever, you can
2 I pick from that.
3

Strawberries seem to lend themselves to

I the similar kind of distribution, and I don *t quite see why
somebody should be required as a store owner to so package
them and sell them with cellophane wrapping just to avoid
this kind of potential.
MR. SCHOW:

But, your Honor, when they choose

that method of operation, then the foreseeability factor of
third-party intervention kicks in.
from Canfield.

This is no different

You can say the same thing about lettuce.

THE COURT:
difference in that.

Well, I frankly can see some
I have seen the farmer cases.

I just

saw it recently in -- on the 17th of March when they had
Saint Patrick's Day and they had cases of cabbage right
next to the corn beef, and the cabbage was in farmer-packed
cases, and people were picking off leaves and things like
that, and there was some risk associated with that, and the
cases were out in front of the meat counter.

So I can see

that
But I have a harder time seeing why, when they
have a normal stand of distribution and one strawberry
falls, that I should hold them liable or at least allow it
to go to the jury when there is nothing to give me reason
to believe that they had notice of it and that they had
notice that it was in a dangerous condition and that it was
41

17
foreseeable that this person would fall on that strawberry
or any person would fall on that strawberry.
MR. SCHOW:

Well, your Honor, again, plaintiff

doesn't need to show notice.

Plaintiff needs to show

5 J basically foreseeability, and that foreseeability has been
6

established.

7

Now, we're not saying Albertson's should be held

8

liable for any injury that arises out of a product carried

9

m

its store.

Defendant points to the case where I guess a

10

packaged piece of pumpkin pie ends up on the floor.

11

that's certainly less foreseeable than the strawberry

12

Well,

J situation.

13

What we're talking about here with strawberries

14

and grapes and things are round, squishy fruit that present
i

15

a special hazard.

16

if Albertson's invited people to peel bananas and eat them

17

on the spot and someone dropped a peel, there might be a

18
19

It's the banana-peel syndrome.

I mean

J problem.
This isn't a problem with all produce or all the

20

products marketed by Albertson's.

If a customer drops a

21

package of diapers on the floor, there's much less chance

22

that a customer's going to fall over that and get injured,

23

but a strawberry's a small item and is particularly squishy

24

and slippery, and the way they market them, it's

25

foreseeable to them by their own statement that customers
42
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1

are going to feed their kids with it or they're going to

2

overpackage them or they're just not going to take care of

3

them, and by putting them in containers, that's safer.

4

THE COURT:

If I follow your argument, everybody

5

that slips on a strawberry, grape, or almost any item of

6

produce is entitled to go to the jury 'cause it's

7

foreseeable that those could fall off the counters.

8

they slip on a package of diapers, they may not, or a can

9

of beans if it is on the floor, they may not, but produce,

If

10

because of the way it is marketed and packaged and sold,

11

it's foreseeable that it can fall on the floor.

12

MR. SCHOW:

Well, I think the important point

13

made in Canfield, your Honor, is that this is a method of

14

operation chosen by Albertson's, and why is it chosen by

15

Albertson's?

16

these strawberries in the way they do because it's a very

17

attractive way to display them.

18

strawberries that way, and I don't have to worry about a

19

green one or a rotten one hiding in the middle of the box.

20

That increases profitability, but they're paying a price

21

for that, and a jury can certainly look at the facts of

22

this case and determine whether that is reasonable or not.

23

Because it increases profit.

They display

I appreciate buying

Going back to Canfield, the Court states,

24

"Summary judgment should be granted with extreme caution

25

where the negligence of the property owner is alleged.
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19
1

I Issues involved in negligence become questions of law only

2

when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can

3

be drawn from them."

4

More than one conclusion can be drawn here, your

5

Honor.

6

and say, "It's probably not a good idea to display

7

strawberries like that.

8

condition."

9

A jury could easily look at the facts of this case

It's probably a dangerous

It's probably even more important to find for the

10

plaintiff in this case because Albertson's knew —

Mr.

11

Wilkes doesn't say that people are always dropping coconuts

12

or cucumbers or watermelons.

13

strawberries, grapes, and peanuts, these types of things.

14

Albertson's knows that.

He specifically states

It's known it for years.

15

And just the mere fact that by some -- some great

16

fortune no one has been hurt falling on a strawberry in the

17

past few years shouldn't preclude the plaintiff from

18

presenting those facts to the jury and saying, "You

19

determine this.

20

testimony and based on the way this display looks" --

21

contrary to Mr. Wilkes, no barriers.

22

pictures, and that's an outright misrepresentation to the

23

Court, and if the defendant didn't think it was important

24

to have barriers around strawberries, he wouldn't have made

25

that misrepresentation in his affidavit.
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You determine, based on Albertson's own

The Court's seen

the

Even Albertson's

20
thinks those barriers are important.

Even Albertson's

thinks the floor mats are imoortant when it comes to
squishy fruit
Plaintiff's testimony is there were no barriers.
5

I The pictures support that.

There were no floor mats.

6

I pictures support that.

7

I that Albertson's can make to render this potentially

8

dangerous method of display much less so by placing

9

barriers around and by putting floor mats down, nonskid

The

There are very simple precautions

10

floor mats.

11

the jury should look at to determine whether that method of

12

display is dangerous or not.

13

They didn't do that.

These are other facts

And unless the Court has further questions, I

14

just emphasize that the facts and inferences to be drawn

15

I therefrom have to be viewed in a light most favorable to

16

the plaintiff.

Summary judgment simply is not appropriate

17

in this case.

18

at and determine if that is a dangerous method of operation

19

and, based on Albertson's foreseeability, whether they

20

should have some liability or all liability for the

21

injuries suffered by the plaintiff in this case.

The facts are sufficient for a jury to look

22

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Schow.

23

MR. SCHOW:

Thank you.

24

MR. LUND:

25

THE COURT:

Can I just have a moment, your Honor?
Certainly you may.
45

Yes, Mr. Lund.

21
1

I

2

| common misapprehension there with respect to Canfield is

3

I this perception that it's overturned all these years of

4

MR. LUND:

Your Honor, I think perhaps the most

notice law that we have.

5

It doesn't.

The Court recognizes in Canfield and says in

6

general that there are two theories which may be applied,

7

and it goes on to talk about them.

8

course, is a notice argument, which we've talked about.

9

The second theory occurs and is triggered when -- and this

The first theory, of

10

is what the Court said, that the second theory usually

11

requires that the store owner, its agents, or employees

12

actually create the condition of the defect that causes an

13

injury.

14

We don't know what brought this strawberry to be

15

here.

The plaintiff admitted in her deposition testimony,

16

"I don't know how it got there."

17

child could have brought it in with him from outside.

18

don't know how it got there.

19

of the strawberry display such as we have it.

For all we know, a small
We

Truly, it is in the proximity

20

The plaintiff, who's introduced pictures which

21

have no relevance to this case because this entire store

22

has been gutted -- this is the only picture we have of the

23

way the area looked on the day in question, and despite the

24

poor quality, it's what we have, and you can see there's

25

mats, there's tables with edges around them, the things
46

22
that the plaintiff is talking about.
2 |

But I submit that these things are really

3 | irrelevant because the undisputed facts in this case are:
4 I She doesn't know how it got there; she has no proof that
5

Albertson's had any opportunity to do anything about it.

6

And finally, I just ask the Court to imagine what

7

a produce area would look like if all of the sudden the

8

duty was to take everything and package it.

9

in a produce area, and, as the Court pointed out, they sort

Customers go

10

through things.

These are things the customers do, they

11

have done forever, and they do it in every grocery store in

12

the state.

13

Albertson's has just chosen.

14

grocery store in the state uses.

This method of operation isn't something that
It's something that every
It's something that every

15 1 grocery store in the country uses, and there is no evidence
16

that that is negligent or unreasonable in this case.

17
18
19

THE COURT:

If I'm —

we're dealing with a

motion, though, for summary judgment.
1 line?

Where do I draw the

Do I say, "Well, they had ten strawberries on the

20

floor.

Therefore, they should have known they had a

21

dangerous condition"?

22

say, that since the strawberries weren't wrapped, they

23

could or should have known that the strawberries could fall

24

to the floor and thus they should run the risk either of,

25

one, wrapping all the strawberries or defending lawsuits?
47

Do I say, as Mr. Schow would have me

And I have a hard time understanding if I should

1
2

put on the plaintiff the burden to show more notice, more

3

opportunity to cure, or just simply let it go to the jury

4

and let the jury decide, "Well, gosh.

5

and see things on the floor, and if we don't watch them and

6

we fall, we may have to bear the burden ourse]f," or the

7

jury may say, "Under the circumstances here, rather than

8

having her bear the burden, Albertson's should have been

9

more careful."
I don't know.

10
11

We all go in stores

These cases, every case pushes the

line at a different spot.
MR. LUND:

12

I agree, your Honor.

It is a

13

difficult call to make, but I think that we can clearly

14

separate this case from Canfield.

15

involved a situation where there was an abundance of

16

testimony that Albertson's knew that lettuce leaves were

17

piling up around the display because every customer who

18

went to that display was dumping lettuce there, and that's

19

what the case talks about.

20

and what did they do?

21

collecting this lettuce, in hopes of stopping the problem,

22

and the only thing that Canfield went to trial on was

23

whether or not that procedure, using the boxes, was

24

reasonable

25

The case in Canfield

The store employees knew this,

They put boxes there in hopes of

We don't have that situation here
48

We don't have

24
1

strawberries mounting up.

2

the produce piling up and becoming a problem that's so

3

problematic that the store is having to take remedial

4

measures by putting boxes wherever they can for people to

5

throw them into.

6

We don't have evidence of any of

You see, the foreseeability that needs to be

7

focused on here is not the foreseeability that things are

8

going to end up in the store, because that's just

9

foreseeable to everybody.

The foreseeability that they

10

focused on in Canfield is that the customers were

11

intentionally discarding this specific product and doing it

12 I around the lettuce display.
13
14

There is no evidence in this case that anybody
did anything with intention with respect to this

15 J strawberry.

We just don't know, and under Rule 56(e), you

16

can't go to trial based on just your allegations.

17

got to come with some evidence.

18

You've

Now, she's come in, and she has alleged there was

19

a strawberry on the floor, and we said, "That's right.

20

There was a strawberry on the floor.

21

anything about it until we heard about the incident."

22

do the best that we can do with the procedures we talked

23

about with the employee sweeping procedures.

24

can to keep the floor clean.

25

pick up things when thev see them.
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We didn't know
We

We do what we

We instruct our employees to
We do what we can, and

25
1

there is a clear line of cases for the last forty years

2

insofar as I can tell where the courts have upheld the

3

notice theory.

4

I think Canfield, your Honor, is a very, very

5

narrow case, and I think it applies to a situation where

6

the plaintiff can come into court and can show that there

7

is something wrong with the display, that there is

8

something about that display which in and of itself can

9

cause that hazard.

10
11

In Canfield, for example, the Court made
I reference to the situation where the shelves were slanted

12

and it was potentially hazardous because the produce could

13

fall off the rack by itself.

14

There's no evidence like that here.

15

in this case is simply that there's a strawberry on the

16

floor and nobody knows how it got there, and when those are

17

the facts -- and there is a long list of cases.

18

Smith's, the pumpkin pie; Howard v. Aurback's, the oil;

19

Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms and Albertson's where we

20

have cottage cheese on the floor.

21

J Safeway where there was ice.

The evidence

Long v.

We have Martin versus

All of these cases point out

22

that if we don't know how it got there, you have to show --

23

and the plaintiff bears that burden of showing -- how the

24

hazard had gotten there, how long it had been there,

25

whether the store had an opportunity to remedy it.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

2

MR, LUND:

Thank you, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Lund.

Court finds

4

that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be

5

and the same is herein granted.

6

is no adequate basis for the Court to conclude that

7

Albertson's had notice of the defect.

8

display has not been shown to the Court's satisfaction to

9

be in any way inappropriate or hazardous or risky.

The Court finds that there

The method of the

The

10

Court also finds that there is no evidence that the store

11

had any opportunity to remedy the single strawberry that

12

was on the floor had they had -- nor that they had any

13

notice that it was there until the accident occurred.

14

there is no potential for the Court to find that there was

15

adequate foreseeability of the store to be held liable, and

16

the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Thus

17

If you'll prepare an order consistent, Mr. Lund.

18

MR. LUND:

19

THE COURT:

20

(The matter concluded at 10:45 a.m.)

Thank you.
Court's in recess.

21
22
23
24
25

51

STATE OF UTAH

)
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Lori Lawrence, C.S.R., R.P.R.r C.P.f and
Notary Public for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake
County, certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were taken before
me at the time and place herein set forth;
That all proceedings had of record at the time
were recorded stenographicallv by me and were thereafter
transcribed into printing under my direction and the
transcript is a full, true, and correct record of my
stenographic notes so taken;
That I am neither counsel for nor related to any
party to said action nor in anywise interested in the
outcome thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name
this 25th day of August, 1995.

L<2ri Lawrence
C •&«*• K . f

52

u.

K.F.K.

Notarv Public

